


Signature Aggregation in Ethereum

Present and Future






Benedikt Wagner
Ethereum Foundation

Three Concepts of This Talk

Ethereum and
Proof of Stake


Non-Interactive
Multi-Signatures

BLS
→
Post-Quantum



Signature Aggregation Today

Proof of Stake 101





Two Use Cases of Signatures


Execution Layer



Signing Transactions




Signature Aggregation Today



BLS Multi-Signatures

**Multi-signatures vs.
aggregate signatures**

Signature Aggregation Today



Bitvectors Large

One per aggregator

Aggregate aggregates?

BLS Signatures and Multi-Signatures

Prime Order Pairing Groups

$$e: \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T \quad |\mathbb{G}| = p$$

Secret Key

$$sk \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

Public Key

$$pk = g^{sk}$$

Signing

$$Sig = H(M)^{sk}$$

Verification

$$e(Sig, g) = e(H(M), pk)$$

Aggregation

$$Sig_1, \dots, Sig_n \mapsto Sig_1 \cdot \dots \cdot Sig_n = H(M)^{sk_1 + \dots + sk_n}$$

Aggregating Aggregates with BLS

$$\overline{Sig}_{1,3,5,6} \quad 10101100$$

$$\overline{Sig}_{4,6,8} \quad 00010101$$

$$\overline{Sig}_{1,3,5,6} = H(M)^{sk_1+sk_3+sk_5+sk_6}$$


$$\overline{Sig}_{4,6,8} = H(M)^{sk_4+sk_6+sk_8}$$

$$\overline{Sig}_{1,3,5,6} \cdot \overline{Sig}_{4,6,8} = H(M)^{sk_1+sk_3+sk_4+sk_5+2sk_6+sk_8} \quad 10111201$$

Counters instead of bitvectors!

Hint-Free Multi-Signatures [HRW26]

- $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$
- $\text{Sign}(sk, M) \rightarrow \text{Sig}$
- $\text{Aggregate}(\text{Sig}_1, \dots, \text{Sig}_\ell) \rightarrow \text{Sig}$
- $\text{Verify}(\{pk_1, \dots, pk_n\}, \text{Sig}) \rightarrow 0/1$



Sig_i may already be aggregated

Keys given as a set
(no multiset, no counters, no topology)

Hint-Free Multi-Signatures [HRW26]


From Pairings / BLS

Need Multiplicities

10111201

From BARGs [DGKV22]

Need Topology



From Recursive SNARKs



Hint-Free

Signature Agnostic

Security unclear or depth bounded



Hint-Free Multi-Signatures [HRW26]

Feasibility without Recursion


Not Practical (iO)

Signature Aggregation in the Future

Signature Aggregation in the Future



Non-Interactive Arguments for NP relation \mathcal{R}




Completeness: $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R} \implies V$ accepts

Succinctness: $|\pi| \ll |w|$

Knowledge Soundness: V accepts $(x, \pi) \implies P$ knows $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$

Signature Aggregation via SNARKs



Hint-Free Multi-Signatures via SNARKs

Relation \mathcal{R}


Statement: (pk_1, \dots, pk_n, S) where $S \subseteq [n]$

Witness: (Proofs, Sigs)

Constraint: $\forall i \in S :$


$\exists \text{Sig} \in \text{Sigs} : \text{Sig}$ valid signature for pk_i, M

OR $\exists (\pi, S') \in \text{Proofs} : i \in S' \wedge \pi$ valid proof for (pk_1, \dots, pk_n, S') **Recursion!**




* depth needed in \mathcal{R}

Recursion and its Problems # 1: Bounded Depth



$$\mathcal{R}' = \{((x,0), w) \mid (x, w) \in \mathcal{R}\} \cup \{(x, i), \pi) \mid \text{Ver}((x, i-1), \pi)\}$$



Depth bounded!

What about straight-line extraction?

Recursion and its Problems # 2: Relativized Arguments

Many SNARKs in Random Oracle Model are Straight-line Extractable!

$$\mathcal{R}' = \{((x,0), w) \mid (x, w) \in \mathcal{R}\} \cup \{(x, i), \pi) \mid \text{Ver}^H((x, i-1), \pi)\} \in \text{NP}^H$$


Relativized SNARK:
SNARK for NP^H

Impossible in ROM
[BCG24]



Better Understanding of
Recursion needed!

Signature Aggregation in the Future



Why Hash-Based Signatures?

Assumption Minimality

Other schemes also need Hash Functions

Conceptual Simplicity

Ease of implementation and understanding

Information-Theoretic Security in ROM


Setting Parameters & Formal Verification

Standard Model Analysis


Concrete Targets for Cryptanalysis

Which Hash-Based Signature Scheme?

Signature Requirements




Hash-Based Signature Candidates



SPHINCS+

Somewhat Complex




XMSS

Simple

Synchronized / Stateful

**No problem for
Proof of Stake!**



XMSS Overview

From One-time to Many-Time

One-Time Signature

Sign only once

Two signatures leak sk




Synchronized
Many-Time Signature

Sign wrt slots

Sign only once per slot



Good fit for PoS:
Only one vote per slot




XMSS Overview

One-Time Signatures from Hash Chains

Example: $v = 4$ chains of length $2^w = 4$



Tradeoffs for XMSS



Our Work on XMSS

Hash Sigs for Ethereum
[DKKW25]




Standard Model Proofs

Tighter Proofs

From Weaker Assumptions

Concrete Parameters

Top of the Hypercube
[KKW25]




Hypercube Framework
For encodings

Tradeoff Lower Bound

Improved Tradeoff

Aborting Random Oracles
[HKKTW26]




Idealized Model for
Aborting hash functions

SNARK-friendly Encodings

Grinding in Fiat-Shamir


Summary and Research Directions

Summary and Research Directions



Signature Aggregation in Ethereum

Thank you!



Benedikt Wagner
Ethereum Foundation